D01Cognitive Human Differentiation II

When spontaneous differentiation depends on more than what the situation affords…

This subproject builds on project B01 on the situational affordances that shape the spontaneous ebb and flow of cognitive human differentiations (e.g., by age, gender, or performance), by shifting the focus to the individual perceiver.  People encounter the same social constellation with diffent implicit theories about how differences should be understood. These theories can function like cognitive lenses, directing attention, shaping memory, and aligning perception with existing beliefs—akin to a confirmation bias (Oeberst & Imhoff, 2023).

Beliefs about the Relevance of Social Categories

A central focus lies on beliefs regarding how relevant certain human differentiations are, or whether individuals believe a distinction should not matter. The subproject investigates whether such irrelevance claims are associated with reduced spontaneous differentiation or whether cognitive schemas operate largely independently of explicit relevance attributions. If individuals endorse the belief that gender should play no role in the allocation of salaries, are they then less likely to perceive and reproduce gender-based differences in presented pay structures? Or might such differences be “blindly” adopted and perpetuated without individuals being aware of their reproduction? In this sense, “gender blindness” could paradoxically contribute to the stabilization of existing inequalities.

Beliefs about the Essentialization of Social Categories

Another set of beliefs concerns the extent to which social categories are essentialized. Psychological essentialism describes the belief that categorical differences reflect an inherent, largely immutable essence that makes members of a category “alike.” The project examines whether essentialist beliefs facilitate cognitive differentiation by promoting discrete group perception, obscuring overlapping similarities, and reinforcing stereotypical expectations. Are individuals with weaker essentialist beliefs more inclined to differentiate others spontaneously along self-chosen identity markers rather than phenotypical characteristics such as skin color, facial features, or body shape—for example, when a “Turkish-looking” person wears a German national team jersey, or when a phenotypically male person uses she/her pronouns?

Beliefs about the Valence of Social Categories

Finally, the project focuses on beliefs in which categories are not only different but also perceived as unequal in value. Such hierarchical assumptions are closely linked to prejudice and discrimination but may already operate at an early level of perception. The subproject investigates whether evaluative asymmetry increases the salience of a categorical dimension or of individual categories perceived as differing in value. Does the normative devaluation of certain social categories—such as “foreigners” in right-wing populist ideologies, socially stigmatized groups like sex offenders, or historically marginalized groups such as lower varnas in the Indian caste system—heighten the salience of precisely these negatively connoted categories?